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SINCE 1900INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
WHAThavebeen the broad trends in the aggregate volume of
corporate bonded indebtedness in the United States since 1900?
How do present levels compare with those of the past? What
shifts have occurred in the major industry and size components
of this aggregate and in the position of corporate bonds relative
to other types of indebtedness? What are the principal factors
influencing the volume of new bonds offered to investors and
the volume of old bonds extinguished? In particular, how have
these debt series behaved during business cycles and over longer
periods? And what implications does their behavior have for
our understanding of the relation between interest rates and
corporate financing? Finally, what has been the aggregate ex-
perience of investors in corporate bonds as reflected in cash
interest receipts, in the volume of bonds going to default, and
in the time requfred to settle default situations?
Answers to these questions are to be attempted on the basis
of new materials on corporate bond financing. The coverage of
our investigation is broadly limited to bonds issued by domestic
profit-seeking corporations in the railroad, public utility, and
industrial fields, and to the parts of such issues that are held by
domestic investors(individuals and financial intermediaries).
We exclude bonds issued by the financial and real estate groups,
by government, and by eleemosynary and other non-profit-seek-
ing organizations. Bonds held by government and by the issuing
corporation are excluded also, as are domestic bonds payable in a
foreign currency.
A corporate bond is a long-term, negotiable debt instrument
running between the issuing corporation and the bondholder. The
most popular type is a "straight" bond, which has a fixed coupon
rate and single maturity date; such issues account for approxi-
mately 90 to 95 percent of the total par amount for all types.
Bond issues may also mature serially (serial bonds); interest pay-
ments may vary in some predetermined way with earnings (income
bonds); or the issues may be offered explicitly for the purchase
of such equipment as the rolling stock of railroads, street rail-
ways, etc. (equipment obligations); but these minor types of4 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
issues account in the aggregate for only about 5 to 10 percent
of the principal amount of bonded debt outstanding.1
IN OUTSTANDINCS
Our special compilations of data on outstandings of issues of all
types cover the period January 1900 to January 1944, and reason-
ably reliable extrapolations can be made backward to 1876 and
forward to the beginning of 1951.2 By piecing together these
data, we find that outstandings traced out a very simple trend
over this seventy-five-year period, essentially like that shown on
Chart 2 (page 44) for straight bonds. Since rail debt, which
is the oniy part that can be shown before 1900, was such a large
proportion of the total in the early years, we infer that the funded
debt of all industries moved upward continuously from 1876
to 1896 with the rail debt, and, after a possible dip in the follow-
ing year, again moved upward to 1900. There followed a con-
tinuous increase from $6 billion to a peak of $32 billion, for issues
of all types, at the beginning of 1932. Outstandings then turned
downward, and except for a brief reversal in 1988 continued
their fall to a trough of $24 billion at the close of World War
II. After that they shot upward, reaching an all-time high of
about $36 billion at the beginning of 1951.
Over the period 1900-1944, for which we have reasonably full
data, the curve of total outstandings, and of each of the major
industry components, described somewhat less than one full
swing upward and downward, following patterns of long-term
growth roughly similar to those observed in many other economic
time series. An initial period of rapid growth was followed suc-
cessively in each case by gradually retarded growth up to a
peak and by mild contraction.
Over shorter periods wfthin the years 1900-1944, bond out-
standings behaved somewhat less regularly than this summary
IThesepercentages characterize the period 1900-1944, but the presuxnp-
tion is that the minor types of issues have recently increased in relative
importance. Approximately half of all corporate bonds offered during 1948-
51 were placed directly with investors (Securities and Exchange Coirnnis-
sion, Privately-Placed Securities—Cost of Flotation, Washington, 1952, p. 5),
and it is known that a large proportion of these (again possibly as much as
one-half) were in serial form.
2Exceptas otherwise noted, data on outstandings refer to the situation at
the beginning of the year.iNTRODUCTION AND SUMMART 5
statement would indicate. But such movements against the trend
as were observed were not sufficiently pronounced to disturb
the underlying pattern. It is suggestive that the high growth rates
that followed World War II were similar to those observed
around the turn of the century. Moreover, these rates already
show some signs of tapering off; but this does not necessarily
mean, of course, that the past pattern of growth and retardation
will be repeated.
Although no systematic attempt was made during the investiga-
tion to trace the effects of the many factors governing the broad
movements in corporate bond outstandings, itis tempting to
speculate about them in this summary statement. Among the
factors that have clearly played an important role are: general
economic and technological developments in industry; the in-
creasing size of business concerns; fluctuations in the price level;
corporate liquidity, earnings, and taxes; and the condition of the
capital markets. It may be of interest to comment on each of
these at least generally.
Industrial Development
Broad industrial developments have had a pronounced effect on
the capital requirements of business and hence on the volume
and composition of outstanding obligations. Generally speaking,
industries with relatively heavy fixed-capital requirements (those
having high ratios of plant and equipment accounts to total as-
sets) have been the most dependent on long-term financing.
For example, during the present century the railroads have had
ratios of fixed assets to total assets ranging narrowly around 90
percent, and ratios of book value of stocks and bonds to total
assets ranging closely around 70 percent.3 Comparable ratios for
the electric light and power industry are respectively 80 percent
and 80 percent; for large manufacturing corporations, 60 percent
and 60 percent; and for large trade, 45 percent and 55 per-
cent.4 Again speaking generally, industries with relatively heavy
8 As used here, "book value" includes the par value of bonds and of stocks
having par value, and the stated value of no-par stocks. Proprietary reserves
and surplus accounts are excluded.
4 Data for railroads are from Statistics of Railways; for the private electric
light and power industry from U.S. Census of Electrical Industries; for manu-
facturing and trade from sample data, covering 84 large manufacturing6 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMART
fixed-capital requirements have been the largest issuers of corpo-
rate bonds. Thus, until very recently the ratio of the long-
term debt of the railroads to their total assets has stood at or
near 40 percent. Approximately the same figure applies to the
electric utilities, but the ratio stands at only about 10 percent
for large manufacturing corporations and at about 2 percent
for large trade.
It is clear, then, that those developments that have encouraged
the expansion of industries with heavy fixed-capital requirements
have also encouraged corporate bond financing. The railroads
expanded rapidly between 1876 and 1900, and their funded debt
expanded apace; at the beginning of the century, as may be seen
in Chart 3, page 46, rail bonds accounted for nearly 80 percent
of the total of all straight corporate bonds outstanding. By then
the railroads were largely "in being," so that rail debt subse-
quently grew much less rapidly than that of the other industry
groups, and now (in 1951) it accounts for only about one-quarter
of total outstandings.
At the beginning of the century, public utilities (mostly street
railways at that time) accounted for 16 percent of outstanding
bonds, industrials making up but 5percent.Like the rails, the
public utilities are heavy users of fixed capital. Along with rapid
technological developments in the electric light and power indus-
try, and the expansion of street railway and telephone and tele-
graph systems, went an increasing use of the corporate bond as a
device for capital financing. These developments were so rapid
that public utility outstandings expanded over tenfold between
1900 and 1932, while for rails the increase was only twofold. And
though public utility debt contracted only a little more rapidly
than rail debt from then until the close of World War II, the
postwar expansion was much greater. From 16 percent of total
outstandings at the beginning of the century, the share of public
utility bonds in corporate bonded debt has increased to more than
50 percent, the remainder being almost equally divided between
rails and industrials.
corporations and 27 large trade corporations, collected by the
Bureau of Economic Research.iNTRODUCTiON AND SUMMARY 7
Growth in Corporate Size
The influence of growth in the size of corporations on outstandings
is somewhat more difficult to trace statistically, principally be-
cause comprehensive data on size of finns and their indebtedness
are not available for most of the period studied. But sample data
for large and small manufacturing concerns, collected by the
National Bureau of Economic Research, give a clue to the effect
of increasing size. During 1926-35 the large concerns (those with
total assets exceeding $10 million) had a ratio of aggregate funded
debt to aggregate total assets of about 10 percent, while for the
small concerns (with assets of less than $250,000) the ratio was
about 5 percent, so that an increase in average size seems to en-
courage the wider use of bond financing. Doubtless this is due in
good part to the fact that large corporations generally have rela-
tively heavier fixed-capital requirements than small concerns, and
freer access to the organized securities markets.
Besides exerting a stimulating effect on outstandings, the
growth in the size of corporations issuing bonds has brought
about a rise in the average size of issue (Chart 5, page 54). Be-
tween 1900 and 1944 the average size of straight issues for the
combined industries increased from $2.3 million to $8.5 million.
Rail issues increased at an almost uniform rate over this period
from an average size of $3.0 million at the beginning to $11.7
million at the end. The average utility issue ranged narrowly
between $1.0 million and $1.5 million during the first two decades
of the century but increased rapidly thereafter until it stood at
$8.1 million by 1944. Industrial issues had a somewhat more
checkered history, with no systematic tendency for their size to
increase until about 1940.
So far as we can determine, the principal factor underlying the
rise in average size of issue was an increase in average size of
enterprise through corporate consolidation rather than a rise in
the size of the productive unit per Se. The effects of consolida-
tion are most easily traced in the railroad field, where the funded
debt of the merged roads was systematically refunded into large
"blanket-mortgage" issues, and in the public utility field in cases
where large issues of holding companies replaced small issues of
operating companies. The average size of industrial issues rose
abruptly between 1900 and 1904 because of the formation of the8 INTRODUCTiON AND SUMMARY
giant trusts, several of which were financed principally by bond
issues. These large issues were subsequently retired and smaller
companies entered the bond market, with the result that the
average size of industrial issues shrank by 50 percent between
1904 and 1912.
Price Level Changes
In addition to their many other effects, prices have two direct
effects on bond financing. Generally speaking, the higher the
price level at the time of financing, the greater will be the volume
of financing required by a given firm. Second, the higher the
level of current prices, the lower the burden of past financing.
No systematic attempt was made to eliminate these price in-
fluences from the series utilized in our investigation; certain
technical problems, such as the selection of the correct price index
and the complexity of an appropriate weighting system, make
this unfeasible. A rough adjustment for price level changes sug-
gests that while the dollar volume of corporate funded debt in-
creased threefold between 1900 and 1920, debt in real terms was
about the same at the end of the period as it had been at the
There were, of course, important changes within the
period: debt in terms both of current and of constant dollars more
than doubled by 1914; by 1920, though the current figures showed
a further increase, debt in constant dollars had fallen back to its
1900 level. From 1920 until 1932 debt in current dollars increased
by only 60 percent, but the increase in terms of constant dollars
was much greater—250 percent—because of declines in the price
level at the beginning and end of the period. Because of the rise
in the price level after 1932, the contraction in constant dollar
debt through the end of World War 11 was even sharper than in
the current dollar figures. It is particularly suggestive that, not-
withstanding the abrupt run-up in the dollar volume of outstand-
ings after World War II, the deflated total in 1951 was about
The movements of wholesale prices are shown alongside those of cor-
porate bond outstandings in Chart 2, page 44. For the period 1913-51 we
used the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of wholesale prices for all corn-
modifies other than farm products and foods (January prices, 1926100).
For earlier years, this index was estimated from movements in the BLS "all
commodities" index.INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 9
equal to that for such years as 1946, 1923, and 1910, and was less
than half of the deflated dollar volume at the peak year, 1932.
Corporate Liquidity, Earnings, and Taxes;
Capital Market Conditions
Along with other factors corporate earnings, corporate cash bal-
ances, tax considerations, and the condition of the equity market
have had an important influence on corporate bond outstandings.
Throughout most of the period of secular expansion 1900-1932,
cash balances appear to have been drained off by expanding
inventories and trade credit, so that corporations necessarily
resorted to the banking system for short-term funds and to the
stock and bond markets for fixed-capital requirements. During the
thirties the situation was reversed. In the industrial field, and to
some extent among utilities as well, inventories and trade credit
contracted, while capital programs were deferred; thus cash bal-
ances partly were used to repay debt obligations, and outstandings
of all maturities declined.6 At the same time, corporations ham-
pered by comparatively heavy fixed charges and low cash throw-
off from operations, for example many railroads and street rail-
ways, were unable to meet payments on their outstanding bonds.
Many of these obligations were later settled by part payment in
stock or by write-downs, which furthered the decline in bond
outstandings.
Throughout World War II the net cash receipts of railroads
expanded markedly, and again many railroads were able to retire
debt. In other fields, expanding cash requirements induced by
the war effort were met partly out of swollen cash balances in-
herited from the thirties, and partly through federal advances
and prepayments to war contractors, deferral of tax liabilities,
and increased retained earnings. When the enormous capital
expansion programs got under way at the close of the war, the
wartime sources proved inadequate, and corporations turned
again to the capital markets. Small and medium-sized corpora-
tions had recourse to the banking system for their external financ-
ing; large corporations financed themselves principally by direct
6Thebanking side of this story is discussed by Neil H. Jacoby and Ray-
mond J. Saulnier in Business Finance and Banking (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1947), pp. 10-13.10 iNTRODUCTiON AND SUMMARY
placements of bond issues with financial intermediaries, thus
causing bond outstandings to rise abruptly. The rise in corporate
tax rates and the deductibility of interest charges in arriving at
taxable income, the growing institutionalization of savings, the
upward surge of commodity prices, and the relatively low level
of stock prices as compared with bonds, all served to encourage
bond and discourage stock financing during the postwar period.
PosmoN OF DEBT RELATIVE TO TOTAL
DEBT: OF SmI3ILFrYANDELEMENTS OF CHANGE
Two things stand out clearly when one examines the position of
corporate bonds relative to other types of debt by means of Chart
1. The first is the stability in the composition of private debt; the
second is the enormous rise in the ratio of public to private debt.
These observations are based on a comparison of our data with
net debt estimates of the Department of Commerce. On the chart,
total corporate debt is broken down into bonds and "other cor-
porate debt," in which are included short-term debt and such
unfunded long-term items as direct mortgage loans, receivers'
certificates, term loans, and other long-term notes to banks.7 As
the chart indicates, bonds and other corporate debt have moved
similarly since 1917, the latter being slightly more volatile prin-
cipally because of variations in short-term debt. With minor
exceptions, corporate bonds have usually accounted for about
two-thirds of corporate long-term debt (not shown separately on
the chart), and the long-term debt of corporations has constituted
about two-thirds of their total debt.
Rough stability is also exhibited in the relationship between
corporate and private noncorporate debt. (In the private non-
corporate category are included the debt of unincorporated
business units, real estate mortgage debt of individuals, and
consumer debt.) Before these two components of private
debt were approximately equal, but from then until the close of
World War II noncorporate debt was lower. In the postwar period
this relationship was reversed, mainly because of the sharp rise in
residential mortgages. Between the beginning of 1946 and the
TheDepartment of Commerce estimates include, and our bond estimates
exclude, the debt of financial and real estate corporations. Hence the dif-
ference—other corporate debt—covers, besides the items listed, an undeter-
mined amount of bonds of the financial and real estate groups.iNTRODUCTION ANDSUMMART 11
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beginning of 1951, private noncorporate debt increased by 98
percent, corporate short-term debt by 78 percent, total corporate
debt by 59 percent, and corporate bonds by only 52 percent.
Public debt rose enormously over the thirty-four years up to
1951, the over-all percentage increase being more than twice that
for the total debt of the American economy. Thus there occurred,
in contrast with the relative stability of the various components
of private debt in most years, a marked shrinkage in the ratio of
private to public debt. In 1917, corporate debt accounted for
about 44 percent of total debt (public and private), and private
noncorporate debt for about 48 percent, so that the private com-
ponents together accounted for about 92 percent, and public debt
for only 8 percent. Thereafter, except for a minor reversal in the
twenties, the share of the public sector in total debt moved grad-
ually upward until it stood at 34 percent just before World
War II. In the years of heavy war financing by the federal
government the share of the public sector increased much further,
reaching its high point, 70 percent of total debt, at the close of the
war. Since then a pronounced expansion in the dollar volume of
private debt and a moderate contraction in public debt have
lowered the share of public debt to 54 percent of the total (at
the begimiing of 1951).
The position of corporate bonds has also changed drastically.
We estimate that they accounted for about 25 percent of total
debt in the years immediately preceding World War I and for
only 6 percent at the close of World War II. Since then, their
share, like the shares of the other components of private debt,
has expanded slightly. At the beginning of 1951 they accounted
for about 8 percent of total debt.
RELATIONS BETWEEN OFFERINGS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS
The volume of funded debt outstanding at any moment measures
on the one hand the total indebtedness of business corporations
arising from their past offerings of corporate bonds (less repay-
ments), and on the other hand the volume of past savings held in
this form by the investing public. To interpret the behavior of
these "stock" figures, we must study the "flows" by which they
are generated.
For this purpose the net and gross flows into and out of the
"stock" of bond outstandings have been measured at variousINTRODUCTION AND SUMMART 13
levels. Ourbasicgross estimates are monthly and annual series of
total offerings (including bonds offered both for new-money
purposes and for refunding old bonds), and of total extinguish-
ments (including both bonds actually extinguished in an eco-
nomic sense and those refunded into new bonds )Thedifference
is the net change in outstandings, which, when added to the
volume of bonds outstanding at the beginning of a period,
generates the series on outstandings described in the preceding
section. Separate estimates of the volume of ref undings (old
bonds refunded into new bonds) enable us to transform the two
gross flow series into series on new-money offerings (total offer-
ings less refundings) and on net repayments (total extinguish-
ments less refundings). All of these series are measured in terms
of par amounts (the principal amount promised by the obligor
at maturity); in addition, three cash series are utilized. We have
measured the gross cash proceeds obtained by business corpora-
tions from the sales of their bonds, the gross cash payments at
extinguishment, and the difference between these, or net cash
receipts of corporations from sales of bonds.
During the period 1900-1943 inclusive, for which we have full
information, the total par amount of straight bonds offered to
(and purchased by) the investing public aggregated $72 billion,
while total extinguishments of straight bonds aggregated $55
billion.Thus the net change in outstandings was only $17 billion.
Refundings accounted for $32 billion of total offerings or extin-
guishments; it follows that only $40 billion or 55 percent of total
offerings was for new-money purposes, and that only $23 billion
or 41 percent of the total volume of bonds extinguished was
actually repaid without refunding.
During the years 1900-1943 the gross amount of cash received
by business corporations from the sale of bonds was $60 billion,
or 84 percent of the par amount of total offerings. The remaining
16 percent was accounted for principally by bonds offered in
8"Totalextinguishments" include bonds retired through maturity, call,
conversion, exchange, payment of bondholders after liquidation, or a change
in the contract not provided for in the original indenture, such as an exten-
sion of the maturity of the issue or a change in the coupon rate. Extinguished
bonds are said to be "refunded" to the extent that they are replaced by new
bonds of the original obligor, or of a successor corporation or affiliate of the
original obligor; all other extinguished bonds are said to be "repaid."14 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMART
direct exchange for old bonds. On the other side of the ledger,
the gross amount of cash paid out by business corporations at
extinguishment was $40 billion, or 73 percent of the par amount
of total extinguishments. The remaining 27 percent was accounted
for largely by direct exchange of old bonds for new bonds. It
follows that the net cash realized by business corporations from
sale of bonds was about $20 billion over the whole period, while
the net change in par amount of outstandings was only $17 bil-
lion: bonds were in effect "sold" at approximately a 20 percent
premium over the amounts repaid to investors. We find, however,
that in most years the net cash flow corresponds closely to the net
change in outstandings. We may therefore focus attention largely
on the behavior of the net change in outstandings, for which our
estimates are most reliable, with reasonable assurance that the
corresponding cash flows are moving in the same direction.
Analysis of the interrelationships among the various bond series
yields some pertinent information on a practical matter, that of
the selection of an appropriate series to be used as an indicator
of the net volume of bond financing. In many credit markets,
namely those where old loans run off rather smoothly and the
volume of refunding activity is not large, a series on new credit
granted (analogous to our total offerings) is a reliable index of
net credit change. The volume of refunding activity in the bond
market, however, is large, and bond offerings statistics must be
interpreted with caution. In 1936, for example, total offerings
reached unusually high levels, but the proceeds of nearly all of
these offerings were used simply to refund outstanding issues.
Since repayments exceeded new-money offerings, outstandings
actually declined. In 1918 the reverse situation obtained: total
offerings were held to a low level by the Capital Issues Commit-
tee, but new-money offerings exceeded repayments, so that the
volume of outstandings actually rose.
Clearly the best measure of the impact of bond financing on
the economy is either the net change in outstandings or the
closely related series on net cash flow. Unfortunately, our data
for these series terminate at the end of 1943, and estimates for
later years are not yet Analysis of new-money offer-
°Estimatesof net cash flow are being prepared by the Securities and
Exchange Commission but have not yet been released for general use. TheiNTRODUCTiON AND SUMMART 15
ings, which measures the gross volume of bonds offered for new-
money purposes, shows that this series is rather highly correlated
with the net change in outstandlings. During the period studied,
about five-eighths of the year-to-year variation in the net change
in outstandings can be imputed to changes in new-money offer-
ings and only about three-eighths to repayments. To put it dif-
ferently, new-money offerings moved in the same direction as the
net change in 33 of the 43 movements registered by our annual
data. It follows that a series on new-money offerings, such as that
currently prepared by the Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
may be of use as a rough indicator of the direction of change in
outstandings until more precise statistics become available.
INTEREST RATES AND BoND FINANCING
The interrelated statistics developed in our investigation should
prove useful in the analysis of the relationships between interest
rates and bond financing. A preliminary examination of move-
ments in high-grade bond yields, net changes in outstandings,
and gross new-money offerings, which is all that is undertaken
at present, will suffice to show that these relationships are com-
plicated, and to indicate some promising leads for further in-
vestigation. The series exhibit both long-run drifts and shorter
ups and downs (Chart 13, page 125). Here we shall concern our-
selves mainly with the former; in the next section we summarize
the principal conclusions obtained from analysis of the short-run
movements.
To the extent that bond yields (the cost of long-term money)
are effective regulators of the demand for bond financing, the
higher the yield, the lower will be the net change in outstandings;
and conversely, the lower the yield, the higher will be the net
change in outstandings. Chart 13 shows that between 1900 and
1920 the trend in bond yields was upward while that of both
new-money offerings and the net changes in outstandings was on
the whole downward. During 1920-32 bond yields moved sharply
downward and then leveled off (rising sharply in 1931-32), while
new-money offerings and net changes in outstandings first rose
SEC has kindly permitted us to use these estimates for purposes of extrapo-
lating net changes in bond outstandings for the years 1944-50 (cf. Chap-
ter 6).16 iNTRODUCTiON AND SUMMAR2
rapidly and then fell. From 1932 to 1945 bond yields declined
almost continuously, while new-money offerings and net changes
rose during 1933-38 and then declined irregularly. After World
War II, yields moved moderately upward through 1948 and
downward through 1950, while over the same years the net
changes rose and fell enormously.
Although some of these movements suggest that interest rates
operated to restrict the demand for long-term money, it is also
true that corporations borrowed most in the twenties when in-
terest rates were above average levels, and less in earlier and
later periods when interest rates were lower. For the period 1900-
1950 as a whole, it is evident that the relation between interest
rates and bond financing was affected significantly by other
strategic forces influencing the demand for long-term money. For
example, in the period 1900-1919 stock prices were generally
higher than they had been at most times in the late nineteenth
century, so that the situation was conducive to stock rather than
bond financing. Again, during World War I the bond market was
controlled and this reinforced the effect of the rise in interest
rates during the war. When control was lifted, bond yields rose
rapidly, yet the decline in stock financing after 1919 induced a
substantial advance in bond financing. During the twenties the
upward trend in business activity, no doubt reinforced by the
decline in bond yields, stimulated bond financing until 1927; but
in 1927-29, while business activity continued upward, bond
financing fell off abruptly as interest rates stiffened and stock
financing boomed. In the depressed thirties, despite the low level
of interest rates and of stock financing, bond financing was at an
extremely low ebb. Finally, in the postwar years the upward
trend of business activity, a corporate tax structure favoring
bonds rather than stocks, and a relatively unfavorable market for
new stock financing all contributed to the boom in bond financing.
A full-dress analysis of all factors affecting bond financing
would carry us well beyond the scope of the study. For the
present we conclude simply that the observed long-run move-
ments in bond yields were not in themselves sufficient to explain
satisfactorily the observed movements in bond financing. This,
of course, does not mean that bond yields play no role in deter-
mining the demand for long-term money, nor does it establish
that associated changes in money rates in other markets, or creditiNTRODUCTION AND SUMMART 17
conditions in general, may not have far-reaching effects. More-
over, even if bond financing should, upon detailed investigation,
prove to have been relatively insensitive to the rather moderate
changes in bond yields that have occurred in the past, the pos-
sibility that large and rapid movements might have more pro-
nounced effects should not be overlooked.
The data do indicate that a secular decline in interest rates
may have a pronounced long-run cumulative effect on bond
financing. As interest rates decline, bonds rising above call price
are successively refunded into lower-yielding obligations. It fol-
lows that a secular decline in interest rates, such as occurred in
the thirties, will ultimately lower the interest burden on debtor
corporations, thus tending to increase profit margins and to en-
courage general corporate expansion. However, the process of
refunding an appreciable portion of outstanding debt is a time-
consuming one. We find, for example, that the impact of the
downward revision of interest rates in the thirties was not fully
felt until the postwar period of credit inflation.
Another implication of a secular decline in interest rates is that
the associated reduction in debt burden may occur most promptly
and be greatest for firms having the most favorable earnings
records and prospects. In the late thirties, for instance, firms in
the industrial and utility groups reduced their interests costs con-
siderably while the railroads, partly because of their low credit
standing and partly because many of their bonds were noncall-
able, efftcted only a slight reduction. The railroads, however,
were able to reduce their interest costs in the forties by the
refunding and repayment of debt.
Finally, the results of a secular decline in interest rates must
also be judged from the point of view of the investor. The down-
ward adjustment of interest rates in the thirties and early forties
reduced the burden of corporate funded debt, as measured by the
ratio between interest actually paid and outstandings, from 4.6
percent in 1982 to 8.7 percent in 1948. Th1s decline of nearly 20
percent in interest costs, while desirable from the point of view
of the debtor corporation, represented an equal decline in the
income received by corporate bond investors.
These findings contribute something to our understanding of
the influence of the long-term rate of interest on the net flow of
funds to industry through the bond market, and suggest some of18 iNTRODUCTION AND SUMMART
the difficulties with monetary theories that posit a uniform and
simple causal relationship between bond yields and bond financ-
ing. The relationship so far as it is observable in our data appears
neither very simple nor very stable. Further evidence to this effect
will be summarized in the next section.
CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN CORPORATE FINANCING
The series on corporate bond outstandings, although influenced
by the business cycle, is dominated by trend movements. The
business cycle affects more strongly the net change in outstand-
ings and the related series on offerings and extinguishments.
Total offerings of corporate bonds and each of the two com-
ponent series—bonds offered to refund other bonds, and bonds
offered to raise new money—exhibit negative conformity to the
business cycle (Chart 17, page 153). This means that as the pace
of general business activity quickens, the volume of bonds offered
in the market typically falls; contrariwise, as the pace of general
business activity slackens, the volume of bonds offered typically
rises. The same behavior characterizes the gross cash proceeds
obtained by corporations from sale of bonds. On the other hand,
total bond extinguishments, bond repayments (total extinguish-
ments less refundings), and gross cash payments by corporations
at extinguishment all show the reverse pattern of behavior. Typi-
cally they are positively conforming series, rising during business
expansions and falling during business contractions.
The cyclical behavior of the net change in outstandings (which,
as we have seen, may be interpreted either as the difference
between total offerings and extinguishments or as the difference
between new-money offerings and repayments) is governed by
the behavior of its components. During business cycle expansions,
offerings usually fall while extinguishments rise, so that the net
changes in outstandings fall. Conversely, during business cycle
contractions, offerings rise while extinguishments fall, so that the
net changes in outstandings rise. Roughly the same pattern char-
acterizes the net cash flow to the corporate sector of the economy
from sale of corporate bonds. Thus, both net cash receipts and
net par amount of bond financing are inverted with respect to the
pace of general business activity.
These findings throw new light upon the familiar theory that
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cycle, expanding during business expansions and contracting
during business contractions. While total credit doubtless does
behave in this way, clearly distinctions need to be drawn
among its various components. Many types of financing—for exam-
ple short-term and stock financing—appear to behave in the way
theory would indicate; but bond financing runs a contrary course
and thus acts, so to speak, as a stabilizing force.
Some idea of the stabilizing role of the bond market during
business cycles may be gained by comparing turning points in
the bond and stock series with turning points in general business
cycles. If we take a stand at the point in the general business
cycle at which stock offerings turn upward, the financial process
appears typically to unfold as follows. Soon after the upturn in
stock offerings and while general business activity is still falling,
the net changes in bond outstandings turn downward. The im-
mediate cause is a rise in extinguishments, possibly induced by
the repayment of some funded debt from the proceeds of stock
offerings. Since certain corporations are still financing their capital
programs via the bond market at this time, bond offerings con-
tinue to rise through early business expansion. As stock prices
become increasingly attractive, corporations turn from bond to
stock financing; bond offerings turn downward; and the net
changes in bond outstandings continue to fall. These movements
persist until a late stage in business expansion, when stock offer-
ings and stock prices fall. In the next stage, proceeds from the
stock market are no longer obtainable for the retirement of bonds;
bond extinguishinents turn downward; and the net volume of
bond financing begins to rise. Bond offerings continue to fall,
however, since the bond market moves sympathetically with the
stock market at this point. Soon after the business peak, the bond
market stabilizes, and bond offerings turn upward, thus rein-
forcing the rise of the net changes in outstandings. These move-
ments continue until late in business contraction, when the stock
market recovers. The entire process is then re-enacted—with a
difference—during the next business cycle. The many variations
from one cycle to another, necessarily neglected here as a number
of individual cycles are merged in an idealized story, will come
under examination later.
It will be observed from the foregoing sequence of events that
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cycles. On the average, when the ratio of stock to bond prices
moves upward from one cycle stage to the next, the ratio of bond
financing to stock offerings usually moves downward (see Chart
19, page 167). And conversely, when the ratio of stock to bond
prices moves downward, the ratio of bond financing to stock
offerings moves upward. This finding is in agreement with the
view that the differential costs of financing in the two markets
determine the relative volumes of financing. The significant point
is that bond prices alone (or bond yields alone) appear to play a
relatively minor role in this story. Indeed, during the cycle, the
net borrowings of the corporate sector are frequently heavier
when bond yields are high than when bond yields are low. More-
over, bond prices and the net changes in outstandings move in
the same direction during parts of the cycle, and in the opposite
direction during others. Detailed study of monthly data reveals
that the timing relationships can be viewed in either of two ways:
(1) the net changes consistently lead the corresponding turns in
bond prices by fairly long intervals; or (2) the net changes lag
behind the opposite turns in bond prices, also by fairly long
intervals. These complex timing relationships cannot be ade-
quately explained, we believe, by any simple theory. of the
response of bond financing to bond yields, or without reference
to the dominating influence of the stock market and the business
cycle. The explanation appears to be that the cyclical timing of
the net change in outstandings is the resultant of the distinctive
timing of its two components, the positive component (new-
money offerings) more or less synchronous with bond prices, and
the negative component (repayments) synchronous with stock
prices and the business cycle. The latter appears to dominate the
timing of the net change so that the net change has its peak at
or near the business trough and its trough at or near the business
peak. Since bond prices usually reach peaks in midexpansion and
troughs in midcontraction, the net change in bond outstandings
thus leads the corresponding turns in bond prices (or lags the
opposite turns ).'Ifthis view is correct, it is necessary to substitute
a theory of differential money costs for a bond yield theory in
order to account for the cyclical behavior of the bond market.
Much empirical research remains to be done before we can
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credit during business cycles.b0 What, for example, happens to
bank credit and short-term interest rates in each cycle stage, and
what is the relationship of these factors to funded debt and equity
funds? How are these various credit series influenced by the
changing cash requirements of business corporations over the
cycle? One may conjecture that as business expands, cash is
absorbed increasingly into inventories and trade credit; that
corporations replenish their depleted cash accounts through the
banking system and the stock market; and that surplus funds
obtained from these sources are used to retire funded debt. Dur-
ing business contractions, on the other hand, the stock market
ceases to be an attractive source of funds; banks allow marginal
loans to run off; and the gap ispartially filled through the
liquidation of inventories and trade credit and the flotation of
bonds.
The foregoing analysis describes the typical behavior of bond
financing during the cycles of the period 1900-1938. An important
exception, however, occurred after the stock market collapse of
1929. At first the net volume of bond financing increased in the
usual way, but in late 1931 the bond market broke badly as the
result of a tightening of the money markets and a general dete-
rioration of credit. The bond market therefore could not perform
its typical contracyclic function at the business trough of 1982.
During the next cycle, 1932-38, and on through the wartime
cycle, 1938-46, bond financing again followed its typical pattern,
moving downward during business expansions and upward dur-
ing business contractions. During the following transitional cycle,
1946-49, however, the series again behaved atypically. Indeed, in
that cycle the net volume of bond financing reached an all-time
high in 1948 at the crest of the business expansion. The postwar
experience raises important questions as to the applicability of
the earlier relationships to the economy of the future. Rising com-
modity prices and taxes, the relatively low level of stock prices,
and the growing volume of institutional funds seeking investment,
we have seen, have all encouraged bond and discouraged stock
10Acontribution in this direction has recently been made by ilse Mintz
inDeterioration in the Quality ofForeignBonds Issued in the United States,
1920-1930 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951). Mrs. Mintz ob-
served a complementary relation between flotations of foreign bonds and of
domestic stocks in the cycles of the twenties.22 iNTRODUCTiON AND SUMMARY
financing since the war. Similar changes have affected the rela-
tionship between stock and bond financing in the past and may
well affect it in the future.
AGGRECATE DEFAULT AND SETrLEMENTEXPEBIENCE
ON CORPoRATE INVESTMENTS
A corporate bond default isdefined as the failure to pay
principal or interest promptly when due. Comprehensive data
on corporate bond defaults in major industry and size groups
are presented in this volume, and more detailed breakdowns
will be examined in a later one. The series are of the inter-
related "stock-flow" type used generally throughout our investiga-
Hon. They provide annual estimates of the volume of bonds out-
standing in default, of new defaults, of default settlements (bonds
previously in default that were restored to good standing, ex-
tinguished through reorganization, etc.), and of the net change
in outstandings in default (new defaults less default settlements).
Ancillary estimates are provided for special categories of new
defaults and settlements.
Between 1900 and the onset of the Great Depression the ag-
gregate volume of corporate bonds outstanding in default was
quite small, both in absolute and in relative terms (Charts 22
and 28, pages 190 and 191). During this period the average an-
nual par amount of outstandings in default was only $0.4 billion,
or 2.7 percent of total outstandings. With the financial diffi-
culties of the early thirties, outstanding defaults climbed rapidly
to a peak level in 1986 of almost $4 billion, or 15 percent of out-
standings. Although there was a mild improvement in 1936-37,
the situation again deteriorated and the amount outstanding in
default in 1940 was about as large as in 1936. After that, default
settlements generally exceeded new defaults, so that the volume
of outstanding defaults declined.
Since rail bonds dominated the market for corporate bonds
over most of the first three decades of this century, one would
expect them to occupy a predominant position in corporate bond
defaults. Actually, they accounted for less than half of the total
volume of bond outstandings in default in the majority of the
years from 1900 to 1933. The proportion of rail outstandings in
default during this period was usually well below the ratios for
the other major industry groups, rarely exceeding 4 or 5 percent.INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 23
Between 1931 and 1940 the status of rail bonds deteriorated
markedly, the percentage in default climbing from 0.5 to 27.9.
Moreover, very few of the rail defaults had been settled by the
end of the period covered by our records: at the beginning of
1944, the proportion of rail outstandings in default (26 percent)
was still nearly as high as in 1940. The volume of utility bonds
outstanding in default was fairly heavy in the early twenties and
again in the midthirties (about 8 percent and 7 percent, re-
spectively), largely because of the poor performance of street
railways in these years. With industrial bonds the greatest diffi.-
culties came in the early thirties, the volume of defaults climb-
ing from $0.1 billion in 1931 to $1.1 billion in 1934, or from 2
to 24 percent of industrial outstandings. By 1944, however, all
but $0.1 billion of the defaults had been settled. At that time
the percentage of industrial outstandings in default was only 4.8;
and for utilities, the comparable figure was only 3.5. This is in
sharp contrast to the rails.
As in the case of the net change in outstandings and its two
components—offerings and extinguishments—the effects of the
business cycle are clearly apparent in the series on new defaults,
default settlements, and net changes in outstandings in default.
The net change in outstanding defaults in any year is highly cor-
related with the volume of new defaults, and both series show
high negative conformity to the business cycle, reaching peaks
at or near business troughs, and troughs at or near business
peaks. The volume of default settlements lags behind new de-
faults, but the lag is irregular owing to extreme variations in the
length of time required to settle distress situations through corpo-
rate reorganization, etc. The latter series, therefore, shows positive
but low conformity with business cycles.
From the investor's point of view, a better measure of default
experience than the absolute volume of defaults is given by the
rate at which bonds go to default and the rate at which de-
faults are settled. As measured by the average annual default
rate calculated over the entire period 1900-1943, default experi-
ence was best on utility bonds and poorest on bonds in the in-
dustrial group (Table 22, page 208). During the first three dec-
ades of the century, rail bonds had clearly the best record. Their
average annual default rate for that period was only 0.9 percent,
as against 1.5 percent for utilities and 2.1 percent for industrials.24 INTRODUCTiON AND SUMMART
This relative performance was reflected in conservative invest-
ment opinion in the period before the Great Depression, when
rail bonds were favored while industrials were frowned upon
by conservative investors, by the compilers of the legal lists
of bonds eligible for savings bank and trust fund investment, and
by the investment rating agencies.
On the basis of the depression experience, there was a pro-
nounced shift in investor preferences from rail bonds to utilities
and industrials. According to their average annual default rate
calculated over the years 1930-43, utility bonds had much the
best experience (a default rate of 1.6 percent per annum), and
they came to occupy a preferred position as outlets for funds seek-
ing low-risk investment. Trends in outstandings since World War
II, and present market-yield differentials, indicate that industrial
bonds are now also a preferred class of investment, while rail
bonds have taken a decidedly secondary position. It will there-
fore surprise some investors to learn that the default experience
with rail bonds during the 'depressed thirties was actually su-
perior to that with industrials. Both rail and industrial bonds
did poorly in those years, but the average annual default rate
for rails (3.2 percent) was lower than that for industrials (3.5
percent).
In seeking an explanation for the superior market performance
of industrial bonds as compared with rails in recent years, one
must take into account the fact that the rate at which bonds go
to default measures only one aspect of over-all investor ex-
perience. Our analysis of default rates was therefore supple-
mented by a parallel analysis of annual settlement rates. (The
annual settlement rate is the ratio of the par amount of settle-
ments during a year to the par amount of outstandings in de-
fault.) As is indicated by Table 23 (page 210), rail bonds had
the lowest settlement rate of the three major industry groups
during the thirties, whereas industrial bonds had the highest.
In short, rail bonds went to default at a slightly lower rate than
did industrials, but remained in default over much longer periods.
In general, the statistical records on settlement rates emphasize
the importance of the average level of earnings in the settlement
of defaults. Industrial corporations' earnings were unstable in the
thirties, but recovered rapidly, and many of their bonds were
quickly restored to good standing. From these we inferINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 25
that defaults were settled more quickly by obligors having a
relatively simple capital structure, and by obligors not sub-
ject to close public regulation, than by others.
Another measure of investor experience with corporate bonds
is provided by the record of interest payments on funded debt.
In our investigation certain monthly and annual series on in-
terest payments have been developed, primarily for use in na-
tional income studies where previously available data of that
kind have been unusually weak. These statistics, which cover
the aggregate volume of interest payments promised by obligors
(contractual charges) and the volume of interest actually paid
(actual payments), also throw light on the ability of business
enterprise to service funded debt. The difference between in-
terest charges and payments is, of course, the amount of interest
in default.
The series amplify and confirm our findings as to industrial
differences in corporate bond defaults. They also show that,
despite the unusual financial disturbances of the Great Depres-
sion, the record of American business enterprise in servicing its
funded debt has been remarkably good. Between January 1900
and January 1944 contractual interest charges aggregated $40.8
billion, and actual payments $38.4 billion. Thus over 94 percent
of all contractual interest was paid during this period, leaving
only 6 percent in arrears. Moreover, in none of the years in ques-
tion did the portion of contractual interest actually paid fall
below 84 percent, and in 32 of the 44 years it exceeded 95 per-
cent. This record does not take account, of course, of reduc-
tions in contract rates through corporate reorganizations. It ap-
pears remarkable, however, when compared with that of foreign
dollar bonds publicly offered in this country. As late as 1952 only
55 percent of the debt service on these obligations was being
met.
Default rates, settlement rates, interest receipts, and the period
from default to settlement each measure an important aspect
of investor experience. It remains for a later stage of the in-
vestigation to examine prices paid for investments at offering,
values of receipts at extinguishment, and the realized yields.